4 
in order to decrease their margins to the point when they 
net of taxes 
still would get the same profityper unit of sales ( or 
even altogether ) as before. They were in this way able 
to get rid of the output of their increasing capacity 
without incurring losses. 
The following interrelation of the post-war investment history 
emerges. Beyond a certain point (when the possibilities of 
mere replacement of equipment were exhausted) the investments 
were creating new capcities which could be disposed of 
only in foreign markets and which made it necessary to 
pursue an aggressive price policy. 
Since all countries were doing in principle the same, 
the policy of stimulating private investment on a world scale 
could not produce any net global result. It would only lead 
to a redistribution of the markets in favor of those countries 
which were better placed ( mainly on account of their labour 
markets which made wage restraint possible ). 
One important implication of this interpretation is that 
the weakness of investment ( or rather,of effective demand ) 
has been endemic already in the 1960s and early 70s 
rather than breaking out only in the middle of the 70s; 
it had been veiled, in the better placed countries 
by their promotion of theexports, whereas in others, mainly 
tuisL itow 
England, ifr, w«-sr-actually felt for a long time. 
Another implication is that since exports in comparison to 
domestic sales were systematically favorud by the policy 
pursued by firms the proportion of home sales had to decline; 
since exports very broadly speaking equal imports on a world scale 
the proportion of imports to domestic sales had to rise which is 
what happened.