saving rate increased and in consequence growth slowed ( Steindl 
1982 ); in 1980 to 1982 there was a deep recession. In addition to 
these influences from the demand side there were, moreover, large 
tax reductions in the 80s without any reduction in expenditure 
which was boosted by the demands of the military sector; the 
implication of this was that even a high level of employment would 
not have sufficed to eliminate the budget deficit. The paradoxon 
was that the business community which had denounced relatively 
small deficits in the past now accepted monstrous ones without 
serious resistence since they were caused by current tax cuts. 
Apres nous le deluge! 
What made this debt policy so unKeynesian and so dangerous was its 
coincidence with a high real rate of interest in the 80s. 
In view of the large role which interest policy played and of the 
fact that it is a function of power of pressure groups in society 
we may ask whether there may not be a sequence of action and 
reaction, of alternating policy modes here,too. There exists 
evidently an opposition of interests of creditor and debtor in our 
economy. Formerly the debtors were prominently represented by 
industry and their interests were opposed by the banks which 
allied themselves to the rentier. One can find examples in history 
when there was an alternation of the preponderance of one or the 
other of those groups ( Bhaduri-Steindl 1985 ). Finance came to 
dominate with the imperial ascent of Britain and home industry was 
relatively neglected; in the 30s industry gained renewed 
importance by means of protection while after world war II the 
influence of the banks gradually increased up to a climax in the 
era of monetarism. 
Today the distinction between the interests of industry and 
finance has been blurred since many large industrial concerns have