6 
of the underlying "maturity" of the economy was the more sudden 
and drastic. I think | .by the way ( that the stock market has 
never quite recovered from this traumatic shock, 
the importance of the market as a source of funds has 
been very limited since, and the valuation which the 
stock markets put on m ost shares has been out of touch 
(■V-xxstu^e <s[ 
with reality^ which is again a condition for the presett time 
game of "raiding'.' 
So far my historical explanation, given a long time ago. 
Of those economists who have paid any attention to it al all - 
a small minority in any case - _§ome have been tempted 
to apply it to the slow dewn of growth after 1974, 
industrial 
and attribute this to the/concentration process of the 
post-war era. I am afraid I do not at all agree with them. 
In my view the historical changes have again brought forward 
completely new facets of the problem. The internationalisation 
of the economy and the changed situation on the labour 
market owing to full or nearly full employment ( up to 1974 ) 
have counteracted oligopoly. 
The long period of post-war prosperity has wrought a number 
of deep changes: we have to look to them for the explanation 
both of the long period of prosperity and of the troubles 
of the last fifteen years. 
In most capitalist countries the share of public spending 
in the GDP f/ 
and taxation^has been high as compared with pre-war ( big 
government V ). The consequence was to make the budget 
knocks 
a large cushion which absorbs some of the sb^eks and punches 
of the business cycle. It cushions , in fact, the profits 
of business. 
This is important especially in connection with another 
post-war development: In some countries household savings