8 
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participation rates especially for women. Thus the U.S. 
would have had to increase its growth rate in order to 
keep unemployment from growing. In Europe the tendency 
was blurred by the movements of foreign workers. Here the 
restriction of investment played the more decisive role. 
As a result there is a legacy of mass unemployment which 
certainly could not be removed in one stroke. 
If there is indeed not enough employment capacity to absorb 
the masses of unemployed then this would offer at least 
a motive and a justification for building this capacity, 
creating in this way at the same time the necessary increase 
in effective demand. There is the objection that after 
building this employment capacity the output capacity 
will be so large that there will be no possiblity to use it. 
There is some force in this argument but I think most of 
the sting can be taken out of it if we manage to increase 
the real wage pari passu with the ratio of output capacity 
to employment capacity. The process makes economic sense 
but it needs some ignition, it does not start by itself. 
We can develop suitable policies only if we understand the 
reasons for the hesitation of the investor. 
The beginning of the Keynesion period three was marked by 
unusually great uncertainties. They came from technology, 
from the environment, from energy, from the dissatisfaction 
with the existing organisation - the burocratic large concerns 
and from consumption. What are people going to do with 
further increases in real income? Here Schefold's remarks 
in the discussion are relevant: The consumer does not have 
a map of indifference curves printed in his brain from which 
he can read off his automatic reaction to a change in