non-owners. Notions that the primary relationship is 
between the owner and the object, even entailing some sort 
of psychic intimacy or identity (Jung, 1963), can be 
encompassed by this framework by including intimacy or 
identity as possible functions. It is also evident that 
ownership need not entail having legal title. In addition, 
other concepts that define function rules relating subsets 
of people (P and U) with events (E) and uses (F) would have 
some degree of equivalence with ownership, e.g. managing 
corporate and state property (Harbrecht & Berle, 1959). 
Second, within this framework, the domains of P, E, F, 
and U would have to be defined. Those who cannot be owners 
would be excluded from the domain of P. Events and objects 
that cannot be owned Hold be excluded from the domain of E. 
Functions and uses that cannot be restricted would be 
excluded from the domain of F. And those who cannot be 
users would be excluded from the domain of U. Probably the 
definitions of domains are largely determined by cultural 
and to some extent technological factors. For example, 
land, slaves, and factories are each ownable in some 
societies and not in others. And it may be that these sets 
P. E, F, and U are fuzzy sets with probabilistic membership 
(Zadeh, 1975). 
Finally, the allocation of ownership rights to