Full text: Semantics of ownership

For instance, as illustrated by the names of large numbers, 
words and peanings can be generated by rules as the need 
arises. This implies that recalling exemplars, for example, 
of 'things that I own' may be a generative task as much as a 
memory task, and that various generative strategies may be 
available for use. 
A second point is that synonymy should not be the goal 
of a semantic analysis. Such a goal resales in a logical 
paradox. If the meaning of a concept is identical to the 
meaning of the concepts into which it is analyzed, then the 
finding is trivial. If it is not identical, then the 
finding is wrong. Rather, the goal of the analysis should 
be to determine semantic entailment. This would be a 
limited goal, in that there would be no claim to an 
exhaustive understanding of the concept. For example, 
"birdness" entails "wingedness" because to determine whether 
or not a thing is a bird, one must do all of the mental 
computations required to determine whether or not it has 
wings. Operationally, the use of entailment in the present 
empirical study of ownership involved measuring which 
criteria of ownership regularly co-occurred with judgements 
that something is owned. 
Finally, there is a concern with two levels or modes of 
semantic processing. One is oriented towards formal, exact

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